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Abstract 
How are wages set in an open economy? What role is played by demand pres-
sure, international competition, and structural factors in the labour market? 
How important is nominal wage rigidity and exchange rate policy for the me-
dium term evolution of real wages and competitiveness? To answer these 
questions, we formulate a theoretical model of wage bargaining in an open 
economy and use it to derive a simple wage equation where all parameters have 
clear economic interpretations. We estimate the wage equation on data for ag-
gregate manufacturing wages in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s. 
 
JEL codes: E52, F33, F41, J31, J51, J63, J64 
Keywords:  Wage formation, efficiency wage, turnover, bargaining, rent 
sharing, nominal wage rigidity, exchange rate policy, competitiveness  
                                                      
* We are grateful for very helpful comments from Louis Christofides, Steinar Holden, Bertil 
Holmlund, Ann-Sofie Kolm, Ragnar Nymoen, Asbjørn Rødseth, and seminar participants at  the 
Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, CESifo, and the Universities of Oslo, Umeå, 
Uppsala, and Zurich. We thank the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) for 
financial support and Ragnar Nymoen and Asbjørn Rødseth for access to their database. 
♦ Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation and Department of Economics, Uppsala 
University. 
♣ Department of Economics, Uppsala University, CESifo and IZA. Address: Box 513, 751 20 
Uppsala, Sweden. nils.gottfries@nek.uu.se. 
♠ Department of Economics, Uppsala University. 
 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  1 Table of contents
1  Introduction ...............................................................................................3 
2  The long run wage equation ......................................................................6 
2.1  Bargaining .................................................................................................8 
2.2  Foreign influences via goods and capital markets...................................10 
2.3  Labour market conditions and unemployment benefits...........................12 
2.4  Labour demand........................................................................................13 
3  Nominal wage rigidity.............................................................................14 
3.1  A measure of nominal wage rigidity .......................................................15 
4  Data, trends and cointegration.................................................................17 
5  Estimation of the dynamic wage equation...............................................23 
5.1  Simultaneity of the exchange rate ...........................................................23 
5.2  Results .....................................................................................................25 
5.3  Long run implications..............................................................................27 
5.4  Country differences .................................................................................29 
6  Alternative specifications........................................................................31 
6.1  Unexpected changes in the labour tax.....................................................31 
6.2  Capital costs.............................................................................................31 
6.3  Using vacancies to measure the state of the labour market.....................34 
6.4  Active labour market policy....................................................................37 
7  Concluding remarks.................................................................................39 
References..........................................................................................................42 
Appendix 1. Additional derivations...................................................................46 
Appendix 2. Data...............................................................................................50 
 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies 
 
2 1 Introduction 
Wage formation and competitiveness are important concerns in open econo-
mies and aggregate wage equations have been estimated for a long time in the 
Nordic countries. Most recent research on aggregate wage determination em-
ploys an error-correction approach, where a long run equilibrium condition is 
embedded in a statistical model of the dynamics.
1 In such models, the long run 
equilibrium condition is usually a relation between the wage share and unem-
ployment. The basic idea is that when unemployment is high, workers can ap-
propriate a smaller share of the cake.  
Such a specification appears reasonable and has had empirical success, but 
its relation to wage bargaining theory is somewhat unclear. A close look re-
veals several inconsistencies between the standard theoretical bargaining model 
- as presented by e g Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) – and the typical em-
pirical wage equation.
2 First, the wage share is constant and independent of un-
employment in the standard theoretical model. This makes it hard to see how 
we can rationalize an empirical specification where there is a long run relation 
between the wage share and unemployment. Second, a standard theoretical re-
sult is that the equilibrium wage is proportional to the unemployment benefit, 
with a “mark up” that depends on the level of unemployment, implying a unit 
elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment benefit (see 
Appendix 1). In empirically estimated wage equations, benefits play a much 
more modest role. Third, the standard union bargaining model allows only an 
indirect role for productivity in the wage equation. For a given level of 
unemployment, productivity affects wages only if it affects unemployment 
benefits or the value of leisure and home production.
3 Empirical models 
typically allow productivity to have a direct effect on wages. The same 
argument applies to foreign prices and exchange rates.  
                                                      
1 See Nymoen (1989), Calmfors & Nymoen (1990), Rodseth and Holden (1990), Johansen 
(1995), Forslund & Kolm (2004), Holden & Nymoen (2001), Nymoen & Rødseth (2003), 
Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & Nymoen (2005).  
2 In Appendix 1 we present a model where the “threat point” of the workers is the expected utility 
if a worker leaves the firm without a job, the production function has constant returns to scale, 
and capital can be rented at a given cost in the world market. Under these conditions, the 
equilibrium wage is proportional to the unemployment benefit with a “mark up” that depends on 
the level of unemployment. The discussion below is closely related to Manning (1993). 
3 This is discussed by Manning (1993), Bean (1994),and Nymoen and Rodseth (2003). 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  3 Finally, most theoretical wage bargaining models are real and static models 
which say nothing about adjustment to shocks and leave no role for monetary 
(exchange rate) policy. Empirical error-correction models allow a general, 
data-based, dynamic structure, but with highly endogenous variables on the 
right hand side of the estimated equation, the economic interpretation of the 
adjustment coefficients is unclear.
4  
In this paper we try to improve the link between theory and empirical work 
in this area. We formulate a model of wage bargaining in an open economy and 
derive a simple wage equation where all parameters have clear economic inter-
pretations. We estimate the wage equation on data for aggregate manufacturing 
wages in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The period is the mid 1960s 
to the mid 1990s when exchange rates were pegged but occasionally adjusted. 
Our theoretical bargaining model differs in two ways from the standard un-
ion bargaining model (Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991)). First, we assume 
that firms face product demand curves, which are not constant-elastic. Instead, 
the elasticity increases in absolute value with the firm’s relative price.
5 When 
demand curves have this characteristic, we can derive a long run wage equation 
which resembles empirical error-correction models, and where foreign com-
petitors’ prices, exchange rates, and productivity affect wages directly. Second, 
we follow Gottfries & Westermark (1998) and Eriksson & Gottfries (2005) and 
assume that to quit is not a credible threat in the wage bargain. Therefore, un-
employment benefits play a more indirect role compared to the Nash bargain-
ing model where the utility if unemployed is taken as the threat point. 
Our dynamic specification is based explicitly on nominal wage contracts 
and the dynamic adjustment coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the in-
formation available to wage setters. Most of the period, exchange rates in the 
Nordic countries were fixed to some currency (or basket of currencies) and oc-
casionally adjusted (devalued). The exchange rate was the key monetary policy 
variable and the main monetary policy shocks were discrete changes in the ex-
                                                      
4 When, for example, the domestic inflation rate is included in the wage equation, it is hard to 
know whether a significant coefficient arises because wages adjust quickly to inflation or 
because shocks to wage costs are passed through quickly into prices. 
5 This assumption is consistent with evidence of less than full pass-through of exchange rate 
changes into export prices in foreign currency and pricing to market; see e. g. Gottfries (2002). 
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4 change rate.
6 By examining how nominal wages responded to exchange rate 
changes and other variables, we obtain measures of nominal wage rigidity. 
The resulting wage equations have a good fit and most parameters are esti-
mated with precision and reasonably similar across countries. Wages depend 
on unemployment, but also on the scope for wage increases in the tradable 
sector. Based on our theoretical model we interpret this as evidence that work-
ers have bargaining power. Unemployment benefits are important, and rising 
replacement ratios have contributed to increasing unemployment. Still, the 
elasticity with respect to unemployment benefits is far below the unit value 
predicted by the standard Nash bargaining model. Shocks to exchange rates and 
productivity have large and persistent effects on competitiveness, indicating a 
high degree of nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate policy and demand man-
agement have played a very important role in the medium term.  
Our paper builds on a long tradition of modelling wage formation in the 
Nordic countries. According to the “Scandinavian model of inflation,” wages in 
the tradable industry must adjust to the scope for wage increases, determined as 
the sum of productivity growth and price increases for tradable goods.
7 This 
model fitted Norwegian and Swedish data for the 1960’s fairly well, but in the 
mid 1970’s, wages rose far in excess of the scope, and this was followed by a 
series of devaluations in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
8 Searching for richer 
models, with better micro-foundations, Scandinavian economists turned to 
union bargaining models and several authors estimated real wage equations 
which were inspired by wage bargaining theory.
9 Starting with Nymoen (1989) 
and Calmfors & Nymoen (1990), subsequent research on aggregate wage 
                                                      
6 With integrated financial markets, a fixed exchange rate implies complete loss of control over 
monetary aggregates and interest rates. Although financial markets were regulated until the early 
1980’s, the openness of the Nordic economies meant that firms had considerable opportunities to 
move their funds to other countries and hence the central banks had very limited scope to affect 
money supply and interest rates. The central banks had to set the interest rate that was required in 
order to maintain the fixed exchange rate. 
7 See Aukrust, Holte & Stoltz (1967), Edengren, Faxen & Ohdner (1970), Aukrust (1977), 
Lindbeck (1979). 
8 Observing wage increases far in excess of what was predicted by the Scandinavian model, 
economists considered the scope as - at most - a long run determinant of wages. Calmfors (1979) 
combined a Phillips curve with a long run zero profit condition to a model of fluctuations around 
the long run course determined by foreign prices and productivity.  
9 Examples are Hersoug, Kjaer & Rødseth (1986), the country studies in Calmfors (1990), and 
Holm, Honkapohja, & Koskela (1994). This work was inspired by union bargaining theory (e g 
Calmfors (1982), Oswald (1985)) and the empirical application to the UK by Layard & Nickell 
(1986). 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  5 determination has been heavily influenced by the error-correction approach, 
where a long run equilibrium condition is embedded in a statistical model of 
the dynamics. Our theoretical model combines elements from the Scandinavian 
model of inflation, union bargaining theory, and efficiency wage theory, and 
we derive a wage equation which has similarities with the error-correction 
equations estimated in recent work by e. g. Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) and 
Bårdsen et. al (2005). 
In Section 2 we derive a long run wage equation relating the wage to the 
scope for wage increases, unemployment, and unemployment benefits. In Sec-
tion 3 we introduce nominal wage rigidity and derive a short run wage equation 
where unexpected shocks cause temporary deviations from the long run equi-
librium condition. In Section 4 we present data and test for cointegration. Em-
pirical results are presented in Section 5 and alternative specifications are con-
sidered in Section 6. We end by summarising our results and comparing with 
other studies. 
2  The long run wage equation  
Let the production function of an individual firm be  ()
1 YKZ N
α α − =  where Z is 
an exogenously given technology factor, K is capital and N is the number of 
workers. Capital is rented at a price R and there are no adjustment costs for 
capital. Turnover among workers is  ( ) / SWW A N  and depends on the firm’s 
own wage,W , the average wage, W , and the probability A that a worker 
searching on the job does get a new job. The function S is decreasing and con-
vex in the relevant region.
10 Turnover is associated with a cost cW per quitting 
worker so the profit of the firm is: 
 
() ( ) / PY W cWS W W A N RK Π= − + − ,   (1) 
 
                                                      
10 See Eriksson & Gottfries (2005) for a simple derivation. W denotes the wage paid by the 
producer, including the tax on labour paid by employers. The latter is assumed to be 
proportional, so it does not affect the relative wage paid to the worker. 
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6 where   is the price set by the firm. Given factor prices, a cost minimizing 
choice of input quantities implies the cost function: 
P
 
() () ( )
1 1 ,, , , , / / CWWARYZ W c W SWW A RY Z
α α α κ
− − =+ , (2) 
 
where  . The demand facing an individual firm is  ()
1 1
α α κα α
− − =− () / DPP 
where  P  is the average price in the market. After wages have been set, the 
firm sets the price and hires capital and labour so as to maximise profits. With-
out loss of generality we may think of the firm as choosing its relative price to 
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⎟ .     (5) 
 
Before we turn to bargaining, let us consider what wage the firm would set if it 
was free to set the wage. This is the “efficiency wage,” W
e, which minimizes 
cost per unit: 
 
1' ( / )
e cS W W A + 0 = .     (6) 
 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  7 The efficiency wage,  , is such that the direct cost of a marginal wage in-
crease is equal to the benefit from lower turnover costs. If, for example, 
e W
() ( ) // SWW WW
σ −








= . The optimal relative wage increases with the state of the 
labour market, measured by the probability that an employed job seeker gets a 
job.  
2.1 Bargaining 
We assume that bargaining occurs in an individual firm, or a group of identical 
firms. The firm/group is small enough that it takes aggregate labour market 
conditions as given. The firm’s objective is to maximize profits and the work-
ers/union cares about the real wage  , where P /
c
i WP
c is the consumer price in-
dex. To model bargaining, we follow Gottfries & Westermark (1998). If there 
is a conflict, there is no production, no wages are paid, and the two parties 
make alternating bids. When a bid has been rejected, it may turn out that the 
workers are unable to continue the strike, in which case the firm can set the 
wage that it prefers,  . Let 
e W δ  be the discount factor relevant to the period be-
tween bids and let φ  be the probability that the workers cannot continue the 
strike. The worker’s optimal bid   is such that the firm is indifferent be-
tween taking the bid and continuing the conflict: 
w W
 





⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ΘΘ
Π= − Π+ Π ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜








the function Π  is defined in (3). Analogously, the firm’s optimal bid 
f W  is 
such that the worker is indifferent between taking the offer and continuing the 













P ⎟ .   (8) 
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8 In equilibrium the first bid is accepted.
11 Assuming that the worker makes the 
first bid, so that  , we can substitute (8) into (7) to get an equation that 
determines W: 
w WW =
() () ,, 1 1 ,, ,,
ee WW W
AA
WW W WW WW
δφ δ φ δ φ φ
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ΘΘ ⎛⎞ Π= − Π − + + Π ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎜⎟








From (6) we know that  /
e WW   is a function of A and thus (6) and (9) implic-






Θ ⎛ = ⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟ .     (10) 
 
The variable   summarizes the key factors determining the surplus to be 
shared between the firm and the workers. How does the wage depend on Θ ?  
Θ
 
Proposition 1: The bargained wage increases with Θ  if and only if workers 
have bargaining power and demand becomes more elastic as the relative price 
increases.  
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
To get some intuition for this result, consider an increase in the market 
priceP . At an unchanged price P this implies a decrease in the firm’s relative 
price  / PP  so demand becomes less elastic. The firm will raise its price and the 
surplus per worker will increase; hence the bargained wage will also rise. 
If demand is constant-elastic the wage is independent of Θ .
12 This case is 
often discussed in the literature (e. g. Layard, Nickell & Jackman 1991). But 
evidence on pricing behaviour suggests that the price elasticity is indeed in-
creasing (in absolute value) in the relative price. Less than full pass-through of 
exchange rate changes into export prices and evidence on price discrimination 
(pricing to market) in international markets can be readily explained when de-
mand functions have this characteristic.
13  
                                                      
11 Thus the wage depends on who makes the first bid but if we let the time between bids go to 
zero, the strategic advantage of the first bidder disappears. 
12 In this case we can write  () ( ) ,, , ,, WW A WWA ii i ΠΘ = Π %
i Θ  for some function  .  Π %
13 See e. g. Goldberg & Knetter (1997), Gottfries (2002). 
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competition for workers: the average wage level and how easy it is for em-
ployed job searchers to get a job. When workers have bargaining power the 
wage will depend on the firm’s ability to pay: productivity, product price, and 
the required return on capital (all included inΘ ). 
2.2  Foreign influences via goods and capital markets 
In order to understand wage formation in a small open economy with a pegged 
exchange rate, the distinction between tradable and nontradable goods is im-
portant. With a pegged exchange rate, foreign competitors’ prices are exoge-
nous for the small open economy, and this affects prices of domestically pro-
duced traded goods. Since the prices of nontradable goods are largely deter-
mined by costs, there is a strong simultaneity between nontradable goods’ 
prices and wages.
14 For this reason, we will not try to estimate a wage equation 
for the nontradable sector. Instead we use the price equation for nontradable 
goods to solve for the wage in the tradable sector as a function of more exoge-
nous variables. 
Assume that there are two sectors, a tradable and a non-tradable sector, with 
wages   and productivities  ,
N WW ,
N Z Z , and that firms in the two sectors hire 
from a common labour market with average wage W . The latter is approxi-
mated by  () ()
1 N WWW
λ λ −
=  where λ  reflects the size of the traded goods sec-
tor. Firms in the traded goods’ sector compete only with foreign firms, who 
charge price 
* P  in foreign currency and the exchange rate is E. Wages in both 






































.   (12) 
 
                                                      
14 In fact, the “prices” of some services are nothing but wage costs per hour. 
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10In a symmetric equilibrium for the nontraded goods sector the price 












⎟ .     (13) 
 
Equations (12) and (13) implicitly define a relation  ( ) /
N WWH A = . Using the 
definition of W  we get  ()
1/ 1 WW H A
λ− =  and substituting into (11) we get: 
 
() ( ) ()
() 11 / 1 / /, FH A W AH A
λ λλ −− Θ= .     (14) 
 




wa z e p r a θ γα γ
α
⎡⎤ =+ =+ + − + ⎣⎦ −
       (15) 
 
where lower case letters denote logs and  0 γ >  . Here and below we leave out 
constant terms.  
We assume that capital goods can be bought and sold in the international 
market at the price  .
* ep +
15 Adjustment costs are disregarded and the log of 
the rental price of capital is taken to be 
* ˆ rrep = ++ , where 
( )
* ˆ ln
ee ri e p δ =+ − ∆ − ∆ i ,   is an interest rate in domestic currency, δ  is the 
depreciation rate, and   is the expected future increase in value of the 
capital good. Substituting into equation (15) we get 











.     (16) 
 
When wages are bargained over in a fixed exchange rate regime, the wage 
level is “anchored” to the exchange rate, foreign competitors’ prices, and 
productivity in the tradable sector. Productivity in the non-traded goods sector 
                                                      
15 This assumption is made to simplify. 
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prices. The role of monetary policy is to peg the nominal exchange rate. Of 
course, this is the key insight in the “Scandinavian model of inflation” which 
was mentioned in the introduction. There are some differences, however, 
compared to the original specification of the Scandinavian model. In the 
original model, exporting firms were assumed to be price-takers and wages 
depended only on foreign prices and productivity. Our model is more general 
since it allows for variations in the relative prices of tradable goods and for 
labour market conditions to affect wages. The required return on capital is an 
additional factor that determines the scope for wage increases. To simplify 









.     (17) 
2.3  Labour market conditions and unemployment benefits 
Labour market conditions affect the wage bargain, not because workers 
threaten to quit, but because a strong labour market decreases employers’ re-
sistance to wage increases via the efficiency wage mechanism.
 16 What is rele-
vant for wage setting in the model above is the probability for employed job 
seekers to get a job. The easier it is to get a job, the weaker is employers’ re-
sistance to wage increases. In the baseline specification, we simply use minus 
the log of the unemployment rate as one indicator of the chance to get a job. 
Unemployment benefits do not affect wage bargaining via the threat point, 
but unemployment benefits will affect the search intensity and choosiness of 
the unemployed workers, and hence the effective competition that employed 
workers face when they look for a new job.
17 To capture such an effect, we in-
clude the log of the replacement ratio (ratio of benefits to the wage) rr in the 
wage equation. Thus our long run wage equation is
18
 
ws u r r γ β −= − + .     (18) 
                                                      
16 Holden (1990) and Gottfries & Westermark (1998) emphasise this point. 
17 Microeconometric evidence suggests a statistically significant but economically modest effect; 
see e g Holmlund (1998), Carling, Holmlund & Vejsiu (2001). 
18 In Appendix 1 we outline a model where unemployed workers face random search costs and 
show that the chance to get a job for an employed job searcher depends on unemployment and 
the replacement ratio. 
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122.4 Labour  demand 
On the demand side, the model implies a positive relationship between w-s and 
unemployment. To see this simply, note that if  0 α = , (5) implies that the num-
ber of unemployed workers is  
 
() ()





LNLD H A A D
M
ZEP Z Z
λ− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −= − Ω − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
   (19) 
 
where L is labour supply, N is employment, M and M
N are the numbers of firms 
in the two sectors, and the chance to get a job, A, depends on the level of un-
employment.
19 For empirical purposes we approximate labour demand with a 
log linear relation: 
 
() uw s η ϕ =− − ,     (20) 
 
where  ( ) ln ( )/ uL N =− L  and where ϕ  represents unobserved shocks to labour 
demand and labour supply.
20
                                                      
19 If  0 α >  the function becomes more complicated and contains the required return on capital.  
20 As we will see, there are indications that ϕ  is nonstationary so there is no stable long run 
demand function. 
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A very large fraction of the labour force in the Nordic countries is covered by 
union contracts and the length of union wage contracts is typically between one 
and three years. Much of the time, union contracts have been relatively well 
coordinated and wage contracts covering several years always specify wage in-
creases to take place during the contract period. These observations suggest 
that non-overlapping Fischer contracts, rather than Taylor fixed-wage con-
tracts, best characterise the Nordic labour markets.
21 To derive a dynamic wage 
equation, we think of wages for period t as being predetermined, set at some 
earlier point in time t-j, based on expectations that wage bargainers had at that 
time.
22 We use  tj E −  to denote the expectation conditional on information avail-
able to wage-setters when they set wages for period t.  





tt W τ =+W , where   is the contracted wage paid to the worker 
(before personal income tax) and 
c
t W
t τ  is the tax on labour, or in logs: 
c
tt ww t τ =+  where  ( ln 1 t ) τ τ =+ .
23 It is   that is written into the labour con-
tract, but wage setters do not know what the labour tax will be, so their expec-




( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c
tj t t tj t t t tj t Ew wE w E τ ττ −− =+ =−− − .   (21) 
 
Assume that  is set to fulfil the long run wage equation (18), but with ex-




( ) () () ( ) tj t tj t tj t tj t t Ew Es Eu Er r γ βµ −−− − =− + +




21 The recent paper by Mankiw & Reis (2002) formulates a model with infrequent updating of 
information that has similar dynamics to the Fischer contract model. 
22 See Gottfries (1992) for an explanation of nominal wage contracts. 
23 A proportional wage tax does not affect the relative wage which determines search on the job 
in our theoretical model. Progressive income taxation has different effects, but we disregard this.  
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14Here we have added a shock  t µ  which represents unobserved factors that 
temporarily affect wages. Further we take unemployment to be determined by 
(20) with an autoregressive demand shock  1 tt t ϕ ρϕ ξ − = +  where  t ξ  is un-
predictable and  1 ρ ≤ . Assuming that wage setters observe variables dated t-j 
we can derive the expected value of   as:  t u
 
() () () () ( ) ( )
jj
t j t t jt t t j t jt t t j t j t j Eu Ews Ews w s u ηρ ϕ ηρ η −− − − − − − ⎡ ⎤ =− − =− −− − ⎣ ⎦ .(23) 
 
Substituting into (22), solving for the expected wage, and using (21) we get: 
 













Lagged wages and labour market conditions enter the wage equation, not be-
cause wage setters have irrational backward-looking expectations, but because 
past wages and labour market conditions are indicators of unobserved and per-
sistent demand shocks. Expected changes in the labour tax are born by the 
workers but unexpected changes are born by firms.  
3.1  A measure of nominal wage rigidity 
(.) tj E −  is defined as the expectation conditional on information available to 
wage-setters in period t-j. We do not know exactly when wages were set and 
even if we did, we do not know what information wage-setters had, so it is hard 
to say what   really is. We therefore use an approach suggested by 
Gottfries & Persson (1988), that allows us to decompose wage-setters’ expec-
tations into a predictable and an unpredictable part relative to pre-specified in-
formation set.  
(.) tj E −
Consider wage setters expectations about the foreign price, 
*
t p , and con-
sider an information set  tj − Ψ  containing lagged variables which are observed 
by the econometrician.
24 Assume that all wage-setters know at least   when 
they set wages for period t, but perhaps more than that. Now we can think of 
two extreme possibilities. One is that they have no more relevant information 
tj − Ψ
                                                      
24 In our empirical implementation, j= 2 and  2 t Ψ −  includes 
*
2 t p −  and 
*
3 t p − .  
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**
tj t t tj EpE p − =Ψ −
*
. Another extreme 
possibility is that they have enough information to perfectly predict the 
outcome:  ()
*
tj t t E pp − = . Gottfries & Persson (1988) show that when agents’ 
information contains at least tj − Ψ  we can write agents’ expectations as a 
weighted average between these two extremes plus a noise term: 
 
() ()
** * * * () 1
pu
tj t p t tj p t t t p t t Ep g E p g p pg p
p η η −− =Ψ + − + = − +  (25) 
where  (
** * u
tt t t pp E p− =− Ψ ) j  is the innovation relative to the pre-specified in-
formation set.
25 The coefficient  p g  is between zero and one and reflects the in-
formation that agents have. If they make perfect forecasts about 
*
t p  when they 
set wages,  p g  equals zero; if they know no more than  tj − Ψ ,  p g equals unity. 
Thus, the parameter  p g  measures the extent to which agents do not foresee 
innovations in
*
t p . The same decomposition can be made for the other right 
hand side variables. Substituting (25) into (24), and similarly for other vari-
ables, and subtracting   on both sides we get our basic wage equation: 
 
tj tj ws −− −
( ) ( ) ( )
*
u
t t tj tj w tj tj utj r t r t
uu u u
et p t zt t t
ws w s b w s b u b r rg r r
ge g p gz g ττε
−− −− − −− − = − − − + −


























. In the long run, the wage 
is proportional to the “scope” for wage increases. Because of nominal wage ri-
gidity, unexpected variations in the nominal exchange rate, foreign prices, and 
productivity cause deviations from the long run solution. Variations in the la-
bour tax affect the wage cost (which includes the labour tax) only if they are 
unexpected. The g-coefficients measure wage rigidity because they tell us how 
                                                      
25  p
t η is by construction orthogonal to  tj Ψ −  and  ; see Gottfries & Persson (1988) or 
Gottfries (2002).  
*
t p
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16much information wage setters have when they set wages. A positive value 
of  e g , for example, implies that wages respond slowly to exchange rate shocks 
because agents have less than perfect information about exchange rates when 
they set wages. This may be because wages are set earlier or because data is 
available with delays.
26 The error term  t ε  contains unobserved shocks and the 
noise in our expectations measures. 
4  Data, trends and cointegration  
Most of the data is the same as in Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) and documented 
in Evjen & Langseth (1997). Data for wages and productivity refer to industry, 
which we take to be the tradable sector of the economy. The wage is measured 
as the wage sum, including social security contributions, divided by the number 
of hours worked. Productivity is measured as value added in fixed prices di-
vided by the number of hours worked. The foreign price is a trade-weighted in-
dex of foreign export prices of major trading partners, and the exchange rate is 
a trade-weighted index of nominal exchange rates. More precise definitions are 
given in Appendix 2.  
In most of our analysis we consider a baseline model where we disregard 
capital  . ( 0 α = )
27 In this case, the scope is 
*
tt tt s epz = ++ , where zt is labour 
productivity in the traded goods sector. Figure 1 shows unemployment and 
wage relative to scope. Unemployment has increased in all four countries, but it 
started to increase earlier and reached much higher levels in Denmark and 
Finland compared to Norway and Sweden. Peaks in unemployment are fol-
lowed by decreases in the wage relative to scope, but there is no evident long 
correlation. The positive trend in unemployment does not produce a negative 
trend in wage relative to scope, except possibly for Sweden. Some other vari-
able must enter into the wage setting relation and one candidate is the replace-
ment ratio.  
                                                      
26Obviously, the estimates will depend on how the information set is specified. For g to be 
identified, the information set must be specified so that  ( )
* Ep t tj Ψ −  is sufficiently different 
from    * pt
27 We reintroduce the required return on capital in the sensitivity analysis. 


































































































Figure 1 Wage relative to scope and unemployment 
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Figure 2 Wage relative to scope (W/S) and replacement ratio (RR) 
Figure 2 shows the replacement ratio and wage relative to scope. In all four 
countries, there was a general increase in benefits in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s. This is long before the rise in unemployment, but the benefit hike may 
have contributed to high nominal wage increases in the early 1970’s. This pe-
riod saw a dramatic deterioration of competitiveness in all four countries. Since 
then, benefits have developed quite differently. The trend in benefits could 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  19 potentially explain some of the secular increase in unemployment in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden.  
Figure 3 shows that there is a clear negative relation between changes in the 
nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency) and changes in the wage 
relative to the scope. Devaluations bring about an improvement in competitive-
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Figure 3 Changes in exchange rate and wage/scope (logs) 
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20Before estimating the structural model, we first examine trends and cointe-
gration relations between the key variables w-s, rr and u. A priori, one may ar-
gue that neither w-s, nor u or rr could really be nonstationary. But there appear 
to be trends in several of the variables, and in most cases, unit roots cannot be 
rejected (see Appendix 3). To avoid estimating spurious correlations it may be 
cautious to treat the variables as I (1).  
When variables are trending we may think of (18) and (20) as potential 
cointegration relationships. If γ  is finite and variables are I (1), the long run 
wage setting curve (18) implies cointegration between w-s, b, and u. In the spe-
cial case when workers have no bargaining power so that the wage setting 
schedule is vertical, β  goes to infinity but  / β γ  takes a finite value, and w-s 
drops out of the wage setting relationship. 
If 1 ρ <  there is a stable long run labour demand function (20) implying 
cointegration between u and w-s.
28 But if shocks to labour demand are perma-
nent   there is no stable long run labour demand relation between w-s 
and u. One reason may be that our measure of competitors’ prices, p*, is imper-
fect and does not fully capture the world price developments which are relevant 
for the export industry in a particular country. The potential cointegration rela-
tionships are summarized in Table 1.  
( 1 ρ = )
                                                     
To test for cointegration we considered models with and without a trend in 
the cointegrating relationship. Using the Johansen method to examine the 
number of cointegrating relations, we found evidence for one cointegrating re-
lationship for Denmark and Sweden in both models using both the trace 
and λ max test statistic. For Norway, we found indications of one cointegrating 
relationship in the model with trend. For Finland there is no evidence of 
cointegration relationship in any of the models. 
The Engle-Granger method produced very different results. Now we found 
evidence of cointegration for Sweden and for Finland in the model without a 
trend. For Norway there is no significant evidence of cointegration in any of 
the models, but the test statistics are fairly close to the critical values. For 
Denmark there is no evidence of cointegration relationship in any of the mod-
els. Since different tests for cointegration give very different results we cannot 
draw any definite conclusions.  
 
28 A special case is that there is a long run zero profit condition that makes labour demand 
horizontal and w-s stationary. In almost all cases, ADF tests support nonstationarity of w-s, so 
this case does not appear to be relevant. 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  21 Table 1 Special cases of the model 
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Note: The wage setting equation isws u r r γ β − =− + . The slope of the labour demand 
curve η  is assumed to be finite. If η  is infinite, a stable labour demand relation implies that w-s 
is stationary. 
 
Assuming that there is one cointegration vector, we estimated the cointe-
gration relationship using two alternative methods: the Johansen method and 
Dynamic OLS. As above, we considered models with and without a determi-
nistic trend in the cointegration relationship. Unemployment was significant 
with the expected negative sign in many of the specifications. The coefficient 
for benefits was more unstable, but had the expected positive sign in some 
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22cases. Overall, these results suggest that there is at most one cointegration rela-
tionship between these variables, and if there is one, it is a negative relation 
between unemployment and wages - a wage setting curve rather than a labour 
demand equation.  
5  Estimation of the dynamic wage 
equation  
To allow for unobserved trending factors, which affect the functioning of the 
labour market, a deterministic trend is included. Because of missing data for 
Denmark we omit unexpected variations in the labour tax in our baseline esti-
mation, i. e. we set  . All explanatory variables except the exchange rate 
are taken to be exogenous or predetermined.
0 gτ =
29 The contractual structure sug-
gests that the error should be a low order moving average. To allow for this, we 
estimated the wage equations by GMM allowing for first order MA errors.  
Measures of   and 
* ,, ,
uu u
tttt ep zr r
u u
t τ  were constructed using forecasting (pro-
jection) equations for each variable including a constant and the variable itself 
lagged 2 and 3 years. The residuals (projection errors) were constructed as 
() 23 01 22 ,
u
tt t t t t t t 3 x xP x xx xhh x h x −− − − =− =−− − . If we first estimate the pro-
jection equations and then use the calculated projection errors in the wage 
equation we will have a problem with generated regressors. For this reason we 
estimate the wage equation and the projection equations jointly.
30
5.1  Simultaneity of the exchange rate  
As always, a major empirical problem is that monetary policy is endogenous. 
In this period, the exchange rates were pegged and the Nordic countries went 
                                                      
29 Manning (1993) has argued that wage equations are typically unidentified because all variables 
which affect unemployment will also affect the wage bargain. Here, lagged unemployment is 
treated as predetermined.  
30 With respect to the exchange rate, an alternative would have been to use the forward exchange 
rate as a measure of the expected exchange rate. Doing this would be complicated by the fact that 
countries pegged to different currencies, and baskets of currencies, in different periods. Also, we 
know that forward rates predict changes in exchange rates very poorly and this is the case also 
for our projection equation. Most of the variation in the exchange goes into e
u. Hence the results 
should not be much affected. 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  23 through several “devaluation cycles” where the official policy was to maintain 
a fixed exchange rate, but periods of high inflation lead to loss of competitive-
ness and subsequent devaluation. The decision to devalue a currency is clearly 
not random and the question is whether this will lead to biased estimates. To 
answer this question, we must think of what causes devaluations. 
The political costs of maintaining the fixed exchange rate rise in a recession, 
so devaluation should be more likely when unemployment is high.
31 This im-
plies some correlation between two right hand side variables in the wage equa-
tion, but such a correlation does not pose a problem unless the correlation is so 
high that multicolinearity becomes a problem, which is clearly not the case.  
If wage setters anticipate devaluation they will raise wages and this will in 
itself make devaluation more likely. Without some commitment device for 
monetary policy, we may end up in a bad equilibrium with continuous high 
wage increases and devaluations (Horn & Persson (1988)). This possibility 
does not contradict the approach taken here because it would just mean that 
most changes in the nominal exchange rate would be anticipated by wage set-
ters and hence they would have small effects on competitiveness ( ) 0 e g = .
32  
A more difficult problem arises if there is some state variable which affects 
both the wage and the exchange rate, but is omitted from the estimated equa-
tion. Such a variable may be expected future output or employment. A pessi-
mistic outlook may lead to lower wage increases and, at the same time, make 
devaluation more likely. This will lead us to attribute too much of the im-
provement in competitiveness to the nominal depreciation of the currency. Our 
estimate of ge will be biased upwards. 
But we could also imagine the simultaneity going the other way. If unions 
become more aggressive and demand higher wages ( t µ  increases) policy mak-
ers may try to bring temporary relief by devaluing the currency.
33 Such mone-
tary accommodation of unexplained wage shocks will lead us to underestimate 
the effects on wage/scope of truly exogenous changes in the nominal exchange 
rate. Our estimate of ge will be biased downwards.  
                                                      
31 Edin & Vredin (1993) found that devaluations in the Nordic countries were more likely when 
the economy was in a recession. The currency crisis model by Ozkan & Sutherland (1998) 
illustrates the political mechanism. 
32 In fact, this is the opposite to what we find below. 
33 During the period with pegged exchange rates, decisions to devalue were effectively taken by 
the government. 
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24To sum up, there are risks that the estimates are biased due to simultaneity, 
but it is not clear which way the bias goes. To construct a measure of exoge-
nous policy shocks, we estimate a “reaction function” for the exchange rate 
where we regress the change in the nominal exchange rate on lags of unem-
ployment, wage relative to scope, and current and lagged real value added in 
manufacturing, (all in logs).
34 We take the residuals from this equation as truly 
exogenous policy shocks and use these policy shocks dated t and t-1 as instru-





Table 2 shows the results for the baseline dynamic wage equation (26).
36 The 
equations have a good fit and all behavioural coefficients are significant at the 
5 percent level with the expected (positive) sign.
37 The coefficient for unem-
ployment, bu, is very similar across countries. The coefficient for the replace-
ment ratio, br, is similar for Denmark, Finland and Sweden, but higher for 
Norway. The significant coefficient for the lagged wage, bw, is consistent with 
the existence of a long run equilibrium wage setting relation between w-s, u 
and rr. Note, however, that according to our theoretical model, bw should not be 
interpreted as an adjustment speed. Rather it reflects the slopes of the labour 
demand and wage setting curves.
38 This illustrates the dangers of jumping to 
economic interpretations without an explicit economic model.
39
                                                      
34 For all countries,   was positively related to u et ∆ t-1 and wt-1–st-1 and negatively related to value 
added in the previous period, but only some of the coefficients were significantly different from 
zero.  
35 This is analogous to the structural VAR approach where one effectively estimates a policy rule 
for the monetary policy variable and interprets the residuals from this regression as truly 
exogenous policy shocks; see Blanchard (1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999). 
36 The simultaneously estimated forecasting equations are reported in Appendix 3 Table A6. 
37 The standard t-distribution is used which is correct provided that there is cointegration, so that 
each coefficient can be written as a coefficient on a stationary combination of variables; see e. g. 
Stock & Watson (1988). tests for cointegration were performed in the previous section. 
38 bw reflects the amount of wage adjustment needed to restore equilibrium. 
39 If the equation had been derived from another theoretical model, e g with quadratic adjustment 
costs, it is possible that bw could have been interpreted as an adjustment speed. 
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gr 0  0  0 0 0.645* 
(0.346) 
Trend De  0.00328** 
(0.000602) 
    0.00532** 
(0.00151) 
Trend Fi   -0.000396 
(0.00112) 
  0.00002 
(0.00200) 








s. e.  0.013  0.018  0.029 0.020 0.016,  0.015, 
0.049, 0.028 
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Period  1968-1997    1963-1994  1965-1997 1966-1997 1968-1994 





































Notes: The estimated equation is (26) with  0 α ≡ 0 gτ ≡  and . Because of convergence 
problems, gb is set to zero in the country regressions. The equation was estimated with GMM 
allowing for first order moving average errors. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
** and * denote significance on the 5 and 10 percent level. 
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26The adjustment coefficient with respect to the benefit ratio is poorly identi-
fied and because of convergence problems we set this coefficient to zero in the 
country regressions. All other g-coefficients are significantly different from 
zero indicating less than full adjustment of wages to unexpected changes in the 
explanatory variables. The coefficients ge and gz are both close to unity, indi-
cating considerable nominal wage rigidity. Within a two-year period, nominal 
wages hardly respond to shocks to exchange rates and productivity. Foreign 
price inflation is to a much greater extent incorporated into wage increases, 
possibly because it is more predictable than exchange rates and productivity.  
Significant trend terms for Denmark and Norway indicate deterioration of 
labour market performance which cannot be explained within our model. This 
may reflect either omitted variables or persistence mechanisms which have not 
been explicitly included in our model.
40  
Since the parameter estimates are reasonably similar across countries it is 
interesting to summarize the evidence from the Nordic countries in the form of 
a panel estimate. The last column shows panel estimates with country-specific 
constants and trends. All behavioural coefficients are significant at the 5 per-
cent level. In the panel estimation, gr is well identified and takes a value which 
is similar to the other adjustment coefficients. 
5.3  Long run implications 
There are three regression coefficients in the dynamic wage equation and four 
underlying parameters, so in general we cannot infer all the long run coeffi-
cients from our dynamic regression. But provided that  1 ρ ≤ ,   and   
are lower bounds on 
/ uw bb / rw bb
γ  and β , with equality if  1 ρ =  (see Table 1). The 
cointegration tests did not show any indication of a stable long run labour de-
mand relation between w-s and u. If, in line with these results, we assume that 
1 ρ = , we can calculate the long run parameters  , , γ βη from the estimated 
coefficients (see lower part of Table 2). Furthermore, η  can be calculated as 
 independent of the value of  () 1/ w bb η =− u ρ . 
                                                      
40 One indication of a less well functioning labour market is increased duration of un-
employment; see e. g. Holmlund (2003). Persistence of unemployment is discussed by e.  g. 
Blanchard (1991), Bean (1994), Eriksson (2001,2002), Eriksson & Gottfries (2005). 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  27 According to the panel estimates  0.15 γ = , not far from the Blanchflower & 
Oswald (1994) benchmark of 0.1. An increase in unemployment from 5 to 
5.5 percentage units will reduce the wage 1.5 percent.  
The panel estimate of β  is 0.39, so an increase in the replacement ratio 
from 60 to 66 percent will raise the wage 3.9 percent for a given level of un-
employment. The elasticity of the wage with respect to the benefit level is 
0.28  ( ) ( /1 ) β β +  which is far below the unit elasticity implied by the standard 
Nash bargaining model with unemployment benefits as threat point. This is 
consistent with our theory, which suggests a more indirect role for benefits in 
wage formation. Still, benefits have a substantial effect. 
On the demand side,  17 η =  implies that a 1 percent increase in the wage 
will raise unemployment by 17 percent, e. g. from 5 to 5.85 percentage units. 
This corresponds to an aggregate labour demand elasticity with respect to w-s 
equal to 0.9.
41
These long run coefficients measure the direct effects on wage setting (18) 
and labour demand (20), but an increase in the replacement ratio will set off in-
direct adjustment as the increase in unemployment moderates the wage in-
crease. The total effect of a 10 percent increase in the benefit ratio is a 1.1 per-
cent increase in the wage  ( ) ( ) / 1 0.11 βγ η +=  and a 19 percent increase in 
unemployment  . Because of the high demand elasticity, 
much of the incidence falls on unemployment. Starting from a 60 percent re-
placement ratio and 5 percent unemployment, an increase of the replacement 
ratio to 66 percent will increase the unemployment rate to 6 percent. This is a 
substantial effect and similar to what Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) and 
others have found in cross country regressions, though large relative to Nickell 
and Layard (1999).
() ( /1 1 . 9 ηβ γη += )




() () / 5
17 0.89.
/9 5
NL N L N L




 According to Gottfries (2002) a 
10 percent increase in wage costs will raise Swedish export prices about 4 percent, leading to a 
decrease in exports of about 12 percent. The total effect on employments depends also on how 
domestic demand responds to wage increases. 
42 See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) chapter 11 for review and references. 
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28Comparing our long run effects to Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) we find that 
the results are qualitatively similar, but our wage curve parameters are larger.
43 
Note, however, that the dependent variable in Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) is the 
product real wage in terms of the domestic producer price while our equation 
determines the real wage in terms of foreign prices. Because of nontraded 
goods and partial pass through of wage costs to tradable prices, we should ex-
pect the product real wage in terms of own prices to respond less to shocks. 
Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) include productivity growth on the right hand 
side of their error correction model without making any distinction between 
expected and unexpected changes. According to their results (page 15) higher 
productivity growth will reduce the wage share and unemployment in the long 
run. According to our structural model, only unexpected productivity growth 
should affect wage relative to scope, and we have imposed this in our econo-
metric specification.
44 We find that productivity shocks have large and persis-
tent effects on competitiveness,
45 but permanent changes in productivity 
growth should not affect wage relative to scope. 
5.4 Country  differences 
With a relatively small number of observations for each country we should be 
cautious in interpreting differences between countries. Still, it is noteworthy 
that Norway sticks out with a flatter wage setting curve and a steeper labour 
demand curve In terms of our theory, a flat wage setting curve means that bar-
gaining and rent sharing is important relative to labour market conditions. A 
steep labour demand curve may reflect the greater reliance on raw materials, 
making exports are relatively insensitive to wage costs. Figure 4 shows the es-
timated wage setting and labour demand curves and illustrates the effect of a 
10 percent increase in the replacement ratio. 
                                                      
43 Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) find an average elasticity of the wage with respect to 
unemployment of 0.13 (calculated from Table 3 using the “Finland-A” specification). The 
average elasticity of the wage with respect to the benefit ratio is 0.18. Also, our coefficients are 
larger than those obtained by Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & Nymoen (2004, ch. 5.5) for 
Norwegian data. 
44 Similarly, we do not allowed taxes to affect w-s in the long run. Proportional taxes are born by 
the workers in our model and we do not consider the effects of progressive taxation; see e. g. 
Holmlund & Kolm (1995). 
45 Aside from nominal wage rigidity, lack of wage adjustment to productivity shocks may occur 
because some fluctuations in measured productivity reflect variations in factor utilization (see 
Carlsson 2003). 

























































W age setti ng
W age setti ng 10 %  i ncrease i n rr
Demand




















Figure 4 Estimated wage setting and labour demand curves 
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306 Alternative  specifications   
In this section we consider several variations of our baseline model. These in-
clude unexpected changes in the labour tax, inclusion of capital costs, alterna-
tive measures of the chance to get a job, and labour market policy.  
6.1  Unexpected changes in the labour tax 
With the wage before labour tax set in a contract, unexpected increases in the 
labour tax should raise w-s temporarily. In Sweden, it is often argued that the 
drastic increase in labour taxes in 1974-1976 contributed to the first Swedish 
“cost crisis”. Table 3 shows estimates where we include unexpected changes in 
the labour tax. Labour taxes raised labour costs in Sweden, but not in Finland 
or Norway.
46. Danish labour taxes have been low and there is no consistent and 
reliable series for Denmark. 
6.2 Capital  costs 
A higher required return on capital should reduce the scope for wage increases. 
So far we have disregarded this by setting 0 α = . When  0 α ≠  we have 
ˆˆ
1







* ˆ s ep z ≡+ + and we can then write the wage equation:  
 






t t tj tj w tj tj utj r t r t
uu T u u
ct wt j e t p t z t t t
wsw s b w s b u b r r g r r
br br g e g p g z g ττε
−− −− −
−
−− − = − − − + −








t t th th ri ep δ ++ = + −∆ −∆
e  we measure it by the government bond rate and 
set  δ  equal to 0.10 to reflect depreciation and risk premium. We regressed 
changes in the exchange rate and the foreign price level (from t to t+2) on their 
own lags (t-2,t-3) and use the fitted values as proxies for the expectations. In 
this case, Zt should ideally be a measure of factor productivity. Since we do not 
have data on capital input that allows us to measure factor productivity, we use  
                                                      
46 This finding is consistent with the results in a number of previous studies of Swedish wage 
setting, where it is typically found that labour taxes influence labour costs in the short run, see 
the survey in Forslund (1997). 
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Trend Fi  -0.000666 
(0.00195) 
  -0.000378 
(0.00189) 








s. e.  0.018 0.027 0.015 0.021,  0.041, 
0.019 
Adjusted R
2 0.98 0.88 0.99 0.98,  0.74, 
0.98 
Period  1963-1994 1965-1997 1966-1997 1966-1994 
Notes: The estimated equation is (26) with  0 α ≡ .Because of convergence problems, gb is set to 
zero in the country regressions. Denmark was omitted because of lack of data. The equation is 
estimated with GMM allowing for first order moving average errors. Numbers in parenthesis are 
standard errors. ** and * denote significance on the 5 and 10 percent level. 
 
labour productivity as proxy for Z  and include linear and quadratic trends in 
the equation.
47  
Our measure on the required return   was low in the 1970s because high in-
flation was not matched by correspondingly higher nominal interest rates. In all 
four countries, the required return increased from about 10% at the start of the 
ˆ t r
                                                      
47 The production function can be written  () ()
1 1 // ZY K Y N α α α − − = . On a steady state 
growth path where K/Y is constant, Z is proportional to Y/N. 
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32sample to about 15 percent at the end. In Table 4 we see no evidence that wage 
setters took account of the required return on capital when setting wages. Either 
wage setters disregard capital costs or we have a poor measure of capital 
costs.
48  
Table 4 Wage equation with the required return on capital 







































































gr 0 0 0 0 0.724* 
(0.371) 
Trend De  0.00368* 
(0.00187) 
   0.00526** 
(0.00150) 
Trend Fi   -0.000600 
(0.00215) 
  0.00054 
(0.00203) 








s. e.  0.012 0.018 0.029 0.019 0.016,0.015 
0.049,0.028 
R
2 0.98 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.97,  0.99, 
0.65, 0.96 
Period  1969-1997    1965-1994 1965-1997 1966-1997 1969-1994 
Notes: The estimated equation is (27) with  0 g
τ
≡ .Because of convergence problems, gb is set 
to zero in the country regressions. The equation is estimated with GMM allowing for first order 
moving average errors. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. ** and * denote significance 
on the 5 and 10 percent level. 
                                                      
48 The low calculated capital cost in the 1970s was partly due to regulation of credit markets, so 
firms may have been rationed implying that the true cost of funds was in fact higher in the 1970s. 
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market 
What is relevant for wage setting in our bargaining model is the probability that 
an employed job seeker finds a job. The easier it is to get a job, the weaker is 
employers’ resistance to wage increases. In our baseline estimation we used 
minus the unemployment rate as a measure of this probability. A more direct 
measure of the probability to get a job is the number of vacancies relative to the 






LNS NU U S
==
−+ − +
 ,  (28) 
 
where V is the number of vacancies, L is the labour force, N is aggregate em-
ployment, and S is the fraction of workers searching on the job, and 
 is the rate of unemployment. We use this formula to construct 
an alternative measure of the chance to get a job.
() / UL N L =−
49 Since we do not have time 
series data on search on the job, we treat S as a constant and set it to 0.05.
50 
Since vacancies are more volatile than unemployment and the constant S is 
added in the denominator, the short run variation in  t A  is driven mostly by va-
cancies.  
Figure 5 shows vacancies and unemployment. There is a negative short run 
relation between vacancies and unemployment in all countries, but the long run 
relation is less clear. Although unemployment has increased substantially in 
Norway and Finland, vacancies show no clear trend.
51 In the case of Denmark 
there is a large drop in vacancies in connection with the large increase in un-
employment in 1975, but no clear trend thereafter although unemployment 
continued to increase.  
                                                      
49 In previous studies of wage formation, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment has sometimes 
been used as a measure of labour market pressure (see e. g. Jacobsson & Lindbeck 1971). Our 
model motivates the use of these two variables, and also yields a specific functional form. 
50 For some references concerning on the job search, see Eriksson & Gottfries (2005). . If 
unemployed workers are at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs, the unemployment rate 
may have a weak effect on wages and vacancies may be a better indicator of the chance for 
employed workers to find a job; see Eriksson & Gottfries (2005) and Eriksson (2001, 2002).  
51 Such a pattern has been observed for many European countries and is often interpreted as an 
indication of a less well functioning labour market.  
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34Does our alternative measure of the chance to get a job work better than un-
employment as an indicator of labour market conditions in the wage equation? 
Table 5 shows that this is not the case. Our new measure of   is significant for 
only two of the countries.
t a
52 The other coefficients are essentially unchanged. 




















































































Figure 5 Vacancies and unemployment 
                                                      
52 In principle, vacancy data should improve our measure of the chance to get a job, but on the 
other hand vacancy data is known to be unreliable. For a long time period data may not be 
comparable because of changes in search methods and registration. 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  35 Table 5 Wage equation with probability to get a job calculated from vacancies 
and unemployment 





























































gr 0 0  0  0  0.974** 
(0.205) 
Trend De  0.00676** 
(0.00223) 
     0.00442** 
(0.00163) 
Trend Fi   -0.000118 
(0.00102) 
   -0.00187 
(0.00231) 








s. e.  0.011 0.018  0.030  0.021  0.015,  0.014, 
0.054, 0.030 
R
2 0.99 0.98  0.85  0.97  0.98,  0.99, 
0.65, 0.96 
Period  1972-1997   1963-1994  1965-1997  1966-1997  1972-1994 
Notes: The estimated equation is (26) where u is replaced by the log of A where A is calculated 
from (28).  0 α ≡  and . Because of convergence problems, g 0 gτ ≡ r was set to zero in the 
country regressions. The equations were estimated with GMM allowing for first order moving 
average errors. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. ** and * denote significance on the 
5 and 10 percent level. 
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6.4  Active labour market policy 
So far, we assumed that only open unemployment contributes to downward 
wage pressure. But workers in active labour market programs may also con-
tribute to downward wage pressure if they look for jobs while in programs or 
because they become more competitive when they leave the programs. To see 








.     (29) 
 
The numerator is the number of vacancies, occurring because of exogenous 
separations, s, and because the fraction searching on the job, S, find jobs with 
probability A. The job searchers consist of workers in open unemployment, 
L-N, workers in labour market programs, M, and workers searching on the job, 
SN. The coefficient ν  measures the extent to which workers in programs com-
pete for jobs.
53 This equation can be solved for A. In order to avoid highly 






































ln ln ln ln . (30) 
 
Thus we add M/(L-N) in our wage equation with a coefficient  lmp b γν − =− . If 
workers in labour market programs exert the same downward pressure on 
wages as openly unemployed workers blmp should be equal bu. As we can see in 
Table 6, blmp is positive for two countries, negative for two countries, and the 
panel estimate is zero. Thus we see no clear evidence that workers in labour 
market programs contribute to wage restraint. 
 
                                                      
53 There is turnover in programs so a positive m may reflect either workers looking for jobs while 
they are in programs, or workers competing better for jobs when they leave them. 
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gr 0  0  0 0 0.717* 
(0.381) 
Trend De  0.00586** 
(0.00187) 
    0.00541** 
(0.00152) 
Trend Fi   -0.00306 
(0.00201) 
  -0.00008 
(0.00201) 








s. e.  0.012  0.018  0.025 0.020 0.016,0.0150
.049,0.028 
R
2 0.98  0.98  0.90 0.98 0.97,  0.99, 
0.66, 0.96 
Period  1969-1997    1963-1994  1965-1997 1966-1997 1969-1994 
Notes: The estimated equation is (26) with the addition of M/(L-N) where M is the number of 
workers in labour market programs.  0 α ≡  and 0 gτ ≡ . Because of convergence problems, gr 
was set to zero in the country regressions. The equations were estimated with GMM allowing for 
first order moving average errors. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. ** and * denote 
significance on the 5 and 10 percent level. 
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387 Concluding  remarks 
Our theoretical model rationalizes an econometric wage equation with wage 
relative to scope as the dependent variable and unemployment, replacement ra-
tio, and lagged wage relative to scope on the right hand side. Such an equation 
has a good fit and produces similar results for all the Nordic countries. In the 
long run, wages adjust to the scope, determined by foreign prices and produc-
tivity. Based on our theoretical model, we interpret this as evidence that bar-
gaining (rent sharing) is important in wage determination.
54
Blanchard & Katz (1999) noted a difference in wage setting between the US 
and several European countries. While a Phillips curve fits the US data quite 
well - and can be interpreted as a vertical long run wage-setting curve - there is 
evidence of a sloping wage curve – a relation between the levels of wages and 
unemployment in European countries.
55 Similarly, Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & 
Nymoen (2005, ch. 4.6) find that a Phillips curve fits Norwegian wage data 
quite poorly. Our model provides a straightforward explanation of such a dif-
ference. The wage-setting curve becomes vertical if one of the following con-
ditions hold: i) workers have no bargaining power, or ii) the economy is com-
pletely closed.
56 Both assumptions appear more relevant for the US than for a 
typical European country. 
According to our estimates, unemployment benefits play a significant role. 
In all four countries, benefit ratios increased around 1970. Initially, unemploy-
ment remained low, but the increase in benefits helps to explain high nominal 
wage increases in the mid 1970’s which eventually lead to rising unemploy-
ment. Of course, benefits may be correlated with other forms of labour market 
regulation which occurred at the same time, e. g. job security legislation which 
increased the protection of insiders. From this point of view, benefits may act 
as a proxy for labour market regulation generally. 
                                                      
54 This is consistent with survey evidence that the ability to pay is an important determinant of 
wages; see references in Manning (1993). 
55 See also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) chapter 8. 
56 If workers have no bargaining power W=W
e and the efficiency wage condition (6) pins down 
A. If the economy is closed the price equation (5) and the wage equation (12) imply a vertical 
WS curve. 
IFAU – Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies  39 We find pervasive nominal rigidity, contrary to the findings of e g Layard, 
Nickell & Jackman (1991, ch. 9) and Cahuc & Zylberberg (2004, ch. 8). They 
test for nominal rigidity by including the acceleration of inflation on the left 
hand side of a real wage equation; if an increase in the inflation rate reduces the 
real wage, this is taken as evidence of nominal wage rigidity. Applying this 
approach, they find large differences between countries and for many countries, 
there is no evidence of nominal wage rigidity. This test may be unreliable, 
however, because inflation is endogenous. If a wage shock is quickly, but par-
tially, passed on into prices, wage shocks will generate a positive correlation 
between real wage changes and inflation, and lead researchers to falsely con-
clude that there is little nominal wage rigidity.  
Our approach is similar but tests for nominal rigidity by examining how 
quickly wages respond to more exogenous variables. We found that nominal 
wages adjust very slowly after shocks to exchange rates and productivity in all 
four countries. Such a high degree of nominal wage rigidity may appear im-
plausible. We should note, however, that union coverage is high, and union 
contracts have often been two or three years long. Also, a high degree of nomi-
nal wage rigidity is consistent with evidence from structural VAR models, 
which show very slow response of wages and prices to monetary shocks even 
in the US.
57  
High nominal wage rigidity means that changes in exchange rates have 
large and persistent effects on competitiveness. From other studies we know 
that competitiveness has substantial effects on demand and production.
58 More 
generally, nominal wage rigidity means that demand management is important. 
Thus we confirm the views expressed by Lindbeck (1997), Rødseth (1997), 
Nymoen- Rødseth (2003), and Holmlund (2003) that demand side factors have 
been important determinants of unemployment in the medium term. It seems 
likely, for example, that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s delayed an increase in Swedish unemployment, which would have 
occurred if demand management had been less expansionary. 
Let us finally note that downward nominal wage rigidity, coordination of 
wage bargaining, and progressive taxes are potentially important factors, which 
                                                      
57 See e. g. Blanchard (1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999).  
58 Gottfries (2002) documents large but sluggish effects of competitiveness on Swedish exports. 
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40have been omitted in the present study.
59 To incorporate these aspects in the 
model developed here is an interesting topic for future research. 
                                                      
59 These aspects have been analysed by e. g. Holden (1994, 2004), Agell & Lundborg (2003), 
Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund & Kolm (1995). 
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A standard model of union bargaining. 
With perfect competition in goods and capital markets, constant returns to 
scale, and labour-augmenting technical progress Zi, we have maximzed profit 
in firm i: 
 
() () ()
, ,m a x /
ii
i i ii ii ii i KN WZ P fK Z N Z N W N R K Π= − − . 
 
Let k be capital per effective worker:  ( ) / kKZ N ≡ . Profit maximization im-
plies that k is determined by  ( ) '/ f kR P =  and the labour share of income is 
. If R/P is determined in the world market the labour 
share is independent of wage setting. Let the wage   be determined by Nash 
bargaining: 
() () 1' / LS f k k f k =−
i W
 









where U is the utility function of the worker, 
c P  is the consumer price, and β  
represents the bargaining power of the workers. The “threat point” of the 
worker is taken to be the expected utility if you leave the firm without a job: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1/
ac Uu U W P u U B ρρ =− + /
c P  
 
where W is the wage prevailing elsewhere, B is unemployment benefit, and 
( ) u ρ  is the risk of remaining unemployed, taken to be an increasing function 
of unemployment, u. Maximizing and considering a symmetric equilibrium 
where  , we get  i WW =
 
( )
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46In the derivation we use the fact that the derivative of the profit function with 
respect to the wage equals minus employment. In the case of constant relative 
risk aversion  () ()
1
// / ( 1


















=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 
 
where σ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The wage is proportional to 
the unemployment benefit with a “mark up” that depends on the state of the la-
bour market. If we allow for monopolistic competition with constant-elastic 
demand this will not change the qualitative conclusion. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Note first that equations (7) and (8) imply  .
wf WWW >≥
e 60 Assume now that 
f e WW > .
61 To find the effect of Θ on the wage we differentiate (9): 
 













ΘΘ ΠΘ − − ΠΘ − Π
=−
Θ ΠΘ − − ΠΘ
e W Θ Θ
. 
 
To simplify notation we have set  1 W =  and left out A. As   the 
denominator is negative, provided the second order condition is fulfilled. Thus 
the sign of the numerator determines the sign. Dividing the numerator by   




/ i dW dΘ is positive if and only if 
 
                                                      
e W
60 To show this, consider first the case when  . Since  () () 1 f we WW W δφ φ =− + >
1 δ < , this immediately implies that   and hence  . If, instead 
 equation (7) implies that that   since profits 
fall when the wage increases. 
f w WW > f w WWW >> e
) e e () ( 1 f ew WW W W δφ φ => − + w WW >
61 For the case when   the argument is analogous.  f e WW =
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Since  is larger than 
w W
f W and  , this holds if 
e W ( ) ( ) / W Θ ΠΘ Π W  is an in-
creasing function of the wage. Using the profit function and the first order con-
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where  ( / i E PP is the elasticity of the demand equation and  () i W Ψ  is the opti-
mal relative price as a function of the wage, holding other variables constant. It 
is straightforward to show that Ψ  is an increasing function. End of proof. 
Labour turnover and the chance to get a job 
Assume that workers have log utility functions. In a short period of length   
an unemployed workers can search or not search and the period-specific cost 
associated with search is 
∆
ζ  which is drawn from a distribution  ( ) H ζ . Let ν  
be an index for whether the worker is searching. The value of unemployment is 





















j ju Vw p s V s V
r
⎡⎤ =∆ − + −∆ +∆ ⎣⎦ +∆
. 
 
An unemployed worker will search if  ( ) ( ) /1
ju AV V r ζ ≤ −+ ∆ . Letting the pe-
riod length ∆ go to zero we get  ( ) ( ) /
jU VV w br s A − =− + + and hence the 
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48fraction of unemployed workers searching at a particular point in time is 
( ) ( ( / HA wb r s A −+ + ) ) . The probability to get a job, A, is given by the flow 
of job openings divided by the number of workers looking for jobs. Job 
openings occur because of quits and turnover between jobs and job applicants 
consist of unemployed workers and those searching on the job: 
 
()





LN H A wb rsA S N
+
=
−− + + +
  
 
where L is the labour force and N is employment. This can be rewritten as 
 




AH A w b r s A s
U
−
−+ + =  
 
where U=(L-N)/L. This equation determines the chance to get a job implicitly 
as a function of the replacement rate and unemployment. 
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Most series come from Nymoen and Rodseth (2003) and is documented in 
Evjen and Langset (1997). 
wt:  log of nominal wage cost per hour in industry. Source: Nymoen et al 
database.  
*




j t p vw p
⎛⎞
= ⎜
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ⎟  where pjt is log of export price index for of country j, 
wij is share of imports to country i coming from country j in and vi is share 
of Swedish exports going to country i. Weights are from 1980. Sources: 
prices from OECD, Main Economic Indicators, export values and import 
values from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.  
et: exchange rate index calculated using the same weights. Source: OECD. 
zt: log of hourly labour productivity computed as value added in fixed prices 
divided by hours worked in industry. Source: Nymoen et al database. 
it: 5 year government yearly bond yield. Source: Ecowin database.  
ut: log of open unemployment. Source: Nymoen et al database. 
nt: log of labour force. Source: Nymoen et al database. 
lt: log of employment. Source: Nymoen et al database. 
t τ : labour tax computed as total wage costs divided by wage costs excluding 
labour tax minus one. Source: Nymoen et al database.  
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2005:5  Isacsson Gunnar ”Finns det en skillnad mellan samhällets och individens   
avkastning på utbildning?” 
2005:6  Andersson Christian & Iida Häkkinen “En utvärdering av personalförstärk-
ningar i grundskolan” 
2005:7  Hesselius Patrik, Per Johansson & Laura Larsson ”Hur påverkar kravet på 
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2005:8  van den Berg J & Bas van der Klaauw “Job search monitoring and sanctions 
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2005:9  Sibbmark Kristina & Anders Forslund ”Kommunala arbetsmarknadsinsatser 
riktade till ungdomar mellan 18 och 24 år” 
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